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INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL ROOTS; BASIC POWERS1
The power of the attorney general to regulate charities has its roots in earliest 
English law. Its origins are to be found in the law of trusts. A trust is valid only if there 
are beneficiaries existing and able to ensure that the trustees fulfill their duties. An 
essential element of a charitable trust was, and is today, that its purposes must provide 
broad public benefit; as a corollary, there can be no specific identifiable beneficiaries 
who can monitor the trustees’ actions and seek to correct abuses of trust. The dilemma 
was resolved by the common law courts by assigning to the attorney general, acting for 
the king in his role as parens patriae of the country, the duty to represent the public – as 
the ultimate beneficiary of all charitable trusts – in assuring that charitable trustees were 
fulfilling their duties. These included the duty of loyalty under which a trustee is required 
to act solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, refraining from any self-dealing and 
assuring that the purposes of the trust are carried out, and the duty of care under which a 
trustee is required to act prudently and not endanger the trust assets through reckless or 
negligent acts.  
Early cases involving charities are to be found in Carl Zollmann’s landmark 
study, American Law of Charities, in which he affirms the oversight role of the attorney 
general in regard to charities.  
It is ... not only the right, but the duty of the state, through its law officers, to take 
action for their maintenance and enforcement. This duty is exercised in America 
as in England through the attorney general, who, therefore, is a proper, though he 
may not be a necessary party plaintiff or defendant as the representative of the 
public, and whose duty is to prevent the breach and to enforce the proper 
                       
1 Prepared for a Conference on "Forces for Rectitude: Who Oversees Nonprofit Organizations and Their 
Overseers?" October 25,2007, sponsored by the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, New York 
University School of Law. The information in this paper is drawn primarily from Marion R. Fremont-
Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Supervision, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Footnotes contain references to citations not available in 
Governing Nonprofit Organizations. 
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application of a charitable trust, and to compel the restitution of any part thereof 
which has been diverted to other purposes.2  
 
 
 The attorney general’s power is not all encompassing. Rather, it is the courts that 
are empowered to correct abuses, while it is the attorney general’s duty to bring abuses to 
the attention of the court and seek correction. The courts are granted wide power to 
correct abuses, including removing trustees and appointing successors, ordering 
restitution, imposing fines, issuing injunctions to prevent continued abuses, and 
appointing receivers. This is not to say that an attorney general is powerless to correct 
abuses. In fact, the threat of suit is often as powerful a weapon as actually initiating suit, 
and parties are entitled to settle issues with the attorney general in order to avoid further 
legal action.  
A concomitant of the power of the attorney general to bring suit to correct abuses 
by charitable fiduciaries has been a limit on the power of others to bring fiduciaries to 
account. With only a few exceptions, members of the general public are not permitted to 
sue charitable fiduciaries for breach of duties; rather this is the exclusive power of the 
attorney general. The rationales for this doctrine of limited standing have been that 
individuals will not serve as trustees if they may be subject to suits by disaffected 
members of the public and concern that private individuals will may use this power to 
advance their own ideological policy preferences. Furthermore, individuals may not bring 
suit to force an attorney general to sue a charity or its fiduciaries for breach of duty.  
This description of early common law is also the description of current law 
governing the oversight powers of the attorney general in Great Britain and in every one 
of the United States. In a number of states these powers have been enlarged by statute as 
                       
2 Carl Zollmann, American Law of Charities, 427 (Milwaukee, Wis.: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1924).  
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an aid to enforcement. Thus, the attorney general must be given notice of legal 
proceedings brought by or on behalf of a charity if the suit involves breaches of fiduciary 
duties or the validity of a gift for charitable purposes, a request to change charitable 
purposes specified by donors or alter methods of administration, or the disposition of a 
substantial portion of a charity’s assets. In some states, notice of a petition to probate a 
will with charitable gifts must also be given to his office and, as more fully described 
below, in some states certain charities must register and file financial reports with his 
office. 
 
MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY EFFORTS TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT 
Given the extensive power of an attorney general, one might assume that 
oversight has been commonplace. In fact, just the opposite has been true. Until mid 20th 
century, it was the rare attorney general who was willing to commit what were always 
limited funds and personnel to this aspect of his duties. In 1943 the attorney general of 
New Hampshire persuaded the legislature to adopt an act affirming his common law 
oversight powers and requiring charitable trusts in the state to register and file financial 
reports with his office. The rationale was that an attorney general could not carry out his 
duties as supervisor of charitable funds without knowledge of the charities within his 
jurisdiction and the nature and extent of their programmatic and financial dealings. In the 
early 1950s statutes patterned on the New Hampshire one were enacted in Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Massachusetts and Ohio.  
In 1954, through the efforts of the New Hampshire attorney general who had 
framed the statute in his state, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a 
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Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act that was subsequently 
adopted in California, Illinois and Michigan, while New York in 1967 adopted one 
similar to the Massachusetts act. By 1968 there were ten states with registration and 
reporting requirements and in those states the attorney general also had been conferred 
powers to investigate potential abuses, thereby enhancing his ability to obtain information 
adequate to permit him to determine whether to bring suit. 
 Today there are 12 states in which certain charities are required to register and file 
annual reports with the attorney general: California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
South Carolina. However, in Minnesota, Rhode Island and South Carolina, the filing 
requirements apply only to certain charitable trusts, while the majority of charities in 
these states are exempt. In contrast, in Massachusetts the registration and filing 
requirements apply to all charities other than those with religious purposes. California 
exempts educational institutions, hospitals and health care service plans. The exemptions 
from the New York reporting requirement are typical of the remaining states; in addition 
to those exempt under the California law, they include fraternal and veterans 
organizations, student alumni associations, historical societies chartered by the state 
Board of Regents, certain trusts with out of state corporate trustees, organizations that 
support those charities that are themselves exempt, governmental entities and 
government-controlled trusts and certain parent-teacher organizations.  
 In all of these states, the annual reporting requirement may be met by submitting 
Form 990, the Federal information return required by the IRS from exempt charities with 
annual gross receipts in excess of $25,000. A number of these states require some 
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additional financial information and three require charities with gross receipts over a 
certain amount to have their financial accounts audited. In Massachusetts this 
requirement applies to charities with gross receipts of $500,000 or more, in New 
Hampshire the threshold is $1 million, while in California, it is $2,000,000.  
 
OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE FUNDRAISING 
 The state registration and reporting requirements are designed to provide an 
attorney general with information about the entire operations of the reporting charities 
and are designed to enhance his ability to correct failures of trustees to carry out their 
fiduciary duties. Fundraising by charities is also subject to state regulation in 39 states, 
including 11 of the 12 with general reporting requirements. State regulation of 
solicitation originated as part of the consumer protection movement in the mid 1960s. As 
such, it applies not only to fundraising by charities, but to for-profit entities that solicit 
for charities or in the names of charities. In 14 of these states, the situs for registration 
and reporting is the office of the attorney general. In Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, 
Ohio, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Minnesota, both regulatory programs are 
administered in the same division. In 16 states, the attorney general shares jurisdiction 
with another state agency, while in four other states, the secretary of state administers the 
provisions of the solicitation statute. In Florida, the regulatory body is the Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services; in Connecticut it is the Department of Consumer 
Protection; and in Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Kansas, the district attorneys have 
jurisdiction. In Pennsylvania, the attorney general, secretary of state, and the district 
attorneys share responsibility, although enforcement originates in the office of the 
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secretary of state, which refers matters to the other governmental agencies for 
prosecution. In California, there is no separate state-wide regulation of charitable 
fundraising, although in 2004, as part of a revision of its charity laws, professional fund 
raisers were henceforth required to register and report, charities were prohibited from 
entering into contracts with commercial fund-raisers who had not registered with the 
attorney general, and were required to adopt certain safeguards in their contracts with the 
professionals.  
  Solicitation statutes provide safeguards for those who handle funds, including the 
posting of bonds. Some states require charities to provide written notice to persons being 
solicited of the fact that information about the charity may be obtained from either the 
state or the charity itself. There is little uniformity in these requirements so that charities 
soliciting nationally may be required to include three or more different notices in their 
solicitation materials.  
 These solicitation statutes also include definitions of prohibited deceptive acts or 
practices and contain criminal and civil sanctions for violations. Many specify dollar 
penalties and prison terms for serious violations. The agency assigned the duty of 
enforcement is given broad powers to conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses and 
demand documents. The broad equity powers of the courts over charitable fiduciaries 
extend to violations of the solicitation laws.  
 Audits of financial accounts of charities subject to these statutes are required in 15 
of the states that regulate charitable fundraising if receipts exceed a specified threshold. 
Some contain a dollar threshold for registration so long as the charities do not use paid 
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solicitors. Contracts with solicitors, fundraising counsel and commercial co-venturers 
must also be filed with the state.  
The major drawbacks to these solicitation statues are the extensive exemptions to 
their reporting provisions and the difficulties of policing solicitations originating from 
outside the state. For charities attempting to be in compliance, the burden is onerous, due 
to the fact that there is no uniformity in coverage, the thresholds for initial filings vary 
widely, and the application of the statutes to foreign charities is not clear. 
Thirty-four of the solicitation statutes do follow a Model Act adopted in 1986 by 
the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and the National Association of 
State Charity Officials (NASCO). In 1998 NASCO developed a uniform initial 
registration statement that has been adopted in 33 states, although seven of them require 
supplemental information. However, there is no common form for annual reports, 
although most require that a copy of the Federal Form 990 accompany the state form. 
In 1999 the state regulators at a NASCO meeting attempted to deal with the rapid 
proliferation of internet solicitations. They adopted a set of principles, named the 
Charleston Principles after the place where they met, defining the circumstances under 
which a charity soliciting funds on the Internet would be required to register and report in 
a specific state. The threshold for jurisdiction is maintenance of an interactive web site 
that specifically targets individuals in a particular state or receipt of substantial 
contributions from persons in that state on a repeated and ongoing basis as a result of the 
Internet solicitations. Ability to enforce such provisions is, inevitably, difficult if not 
impossible. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON REGULATION OF SOLICITATION  
 During the 1960s and 1970s there were fairly wide spread  press coverage of 
charities soliciting funds from the general public who were spending all or nearly all of 
the amounts they were raising on their fund raising efforts so that little if any amounts 
were being expended for charitable purposes. The response in a number of states and 
local municipalities was to place statutory limits on the amount that a charity could spend 
on fundraising. However, in 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court held such limits to be 
unconstitutional violations of the free speech provisions in the First Amendment. In 
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment3, the court struck down a town 
ordinance that placed limits on the amounts a charity could spend on fundraising. Four 
years later the court in Secretary of Maryland v. Munson4 also held unconstitutional a 
state law limiting the cost of fundraising similar to those in Schaumberg but permitting 
the state to waive the limit under certain circumstances. In a third case, Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Caroline, Inc.5, decided in 1988, the Court struck down 
provisions in a North Carolina law that required professional fundraisers to obtain a 
license before soliciting, adopted a presumption that fees exceeding 35% of gross funds 
raised was unreasonable, and required solicitors to disclose at the point of solicitation the 
amount of their fundraising costs.  
 The most recent case dealing with charitable solicitations involved prosecution by 
the Illinois attorney general of a charity that was found to have misrepresented the 
amount it was spending directly on its charitable activities. In what state regulators 
considered a major victory, the Supreme Court in 2003 in the case of Illinois, ex rel. 
                       
3 Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
4 Secretary of Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
5 Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
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Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. held that the First Amendment did not 
prohibit an attorney general from bringing suit against professional fundraisers for fraud 
when the fundraiser falsely represented to donors that a substantial portion of the 
amounts donated would be used for specific charitable purposes.6  The state attorneys 
generals viewed the case as important support for their efforts to regulate solicitations, 
efforts that they believed had been severely hampered by the prior decisions, although it 
was in fact a reaffirmation of language in the Riley decision urging the states to enforce 
their anti-fraud statutes.  
 
CHARITIES OPERATING ACROSS STATE BORDERS AND IN MULTIPLE 
STATES 
Both the registration and reporting statutes and the solicitation laws apply not just 
to organizations formed within a particular state; under certain circumstances they also 
cover charities incorporated or created in other jurisdictions. As noted in regard to 
internet solicitations, the extent of jurisdiction of these state laws is not always clear.  
Generally, a state may regulate an organization that “does business” or “holds property” 
within its borders, with the definitions of these terms following those used to determine 
state court jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. In order for a state to assert 
jurisdiction, there must be some systematic, ongoing activity within the state. Under trust 
law, the defining criterion is the state having the most significant connections to the trust. 
This includes the domicile of the trustees, the physical location of its assets and the place 
where its business is carried out. Similar factors are considered in the case of 
corporations. State laws requiring foreign business corporations to register with the 
                       
6 Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
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secretary of state or corporation commissioner will usually also apply to charities meeting 
the criteria. Uniformly, they will require appointment of a resident agent upon whom 
service of process may be rendered. The problem for charities is to determine how much 
activity or property will give rise to a need to register and report and this is more often 
than not unclear. 
The “Internal Affairs Doctrine” is a conflict of laws doctrine that is applicable to 
corporations. It provides that the law of the state of incorporation is to be looked to in 
regard to the internal affairs of a corporation, rather than the state in which it operates. 
The principle has been generally adopted, although there are some states, including 
California and New York, that have attempted to apply their domestic corporate law to 
foreign business corporations that meet certain thresholds regarding their activities in 
those states.  
In a 1978 California case, the state appeals court applied California law to a 
dispute over the power of a foreign charitable corporation to remove a director, rather 
than the law of the state of incorporation. Recognizing that California generally followed 
the internal affairs doctrine, the court nonetheless refused to do so in this instance in view 
of the fact that the charity had been organized by California residents, was located in the 
state, and had all of its assets and most of its activities there. “... [W]e believe that actions 
taken in California concerning the administration of that charity should not escape the 
scrutiny of California law, merely because the founders chose to incorporate elsewhere.”7  
The case may be of limited precedent, however, due to the fact that, as the court noted, 
                       
7 American Center for Education, Inc. v. Cavnar, 80 Cal. App. 3d 476, 478 (Cal. 1978); See Proceedings of 
New York University School of Law Conference, Serving Multiple Masters: Jurisdictional and Choice-of-
Law Problems Confronting Nonprofit Organizations, November 2 and 3, 2006. 
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the differences between the laws of the state of incorporation and of California were not 
so significant as to have required a different result if California law had not been applied. 
 For charities with substantial activities in states other than the state of 
incorporation, examples of the questions that can arise are whether an audit requirement, 
or rules governing the composition of boards or imposing restrictions on their soliciting 
practices are to be determined by the laws of the state of incorporation or the state or 
states in which the charity operates. Obviously, if several states in which a charity 
operates claim jurisdiction over its internal affairs, compliance could become near 
impossible. 
Determining the extent of state jurisdiction over foreign charities is not a new 
problem. However, it received renewed attention in 2004 after California passed 
legislation requiring certain charities registered with the attorney general to have an audit 
committee, to adopt certain procedures to be followed in determining officers' 
compensation, and in contracting with certain types of professional fundraisers. A posting 
on the web site of the attorney general implied that the requirements would apply to 
charities operating in or holding property in the state and questions were raised as to the 
extent to which these requirements, as well as certain limits under prior law on board 
composition, would apply to charities owning investment property in the state or sending 
mail solicitations to residents.8 At a meeting of the ABA Tax Section Exempt 
Organization Committee in 2005, the Assistant Attorney General In charge of the 
                       
8 California Office of the Attorney General, “Frequently Asked Questions – Charitable Trusts,” available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/charities/faq.php. 
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Charities Division indicated that they did not intend to change existing law governing 
internal affairs. However, the information on the Internet remains unchanged.9
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OVERSIGHT IN PRACTICE 
The work of a charity division in the office of an attorney general is varied. Much 
of the time of the attorneys is devoted to litigation, participating in suits brought by other 
parties where the attorney general is a necessary party or, more rarely, prosecuting 
charities or their fiduciaries on their own motion. Potential breaches of fiduciary duty 
may be uncovered by staff accountants in the course of reviewing annual reports. More 
often matters are brought to the staff’s attention by disaffected parties.  
The issue then will be the reliability of the complainant and the validity of the 
complaint. The nature of the complaints cover a wide range, from allegations of failure to 
carry out the charity's purposes, improper self-dealing, disregard of  restrictions on 
expenditure of gifts or endowment, imprudent investments, misleading fundraising, 
excessive expenditures on compensation or fundraising. For charities in financial trouble, 
the attorney general's office will have to determine whether receivership is appropriate. In 
some instances an attorney general will be called on to intervene in a bankruptcy 
proceeding to protect endowment funds which are not part of a bankruptcy estate.  
In conducting investigations, in those states with active enforcement programs, 
staff will have access to financial reports already on file and will also be empowered to 
conduct formal hearings and demand documents. In the remaining state, the information 
will have to be obtained by other means, including inquiries to the IRS and the charity 
                       
9 “Edited Transcript of the September 16, 2005 Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of 
Taxation’s Exempt Organizations Committee,” Tax Notes Today, November 15, 2005, pp. 38-45. 
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itself. If the attorney general determines that litigation is warranted, the major 
consideration in moving forward, of course, will be availability of staff and funding. 
There will be standing issues to resolve, in particular whether private parties should be 
permitted to intervene, or whether relators could be appointed to act for the attorney 
general. There will also be the question of what sanctions should be sought - removal, 
restitution, surcharges -  and the effect of immunity provisions, liability shields and the 
availability and impact on the litigation of the existence of directors and officers 
insurance. Use of the threat of litigation to force settlements - which has led to charges of 
overreaching by an attorney general - is discussed below.  
Often, particularly if mismanagement or board malfunction is involved, the staff 
will be able to work  with the charity's fiduciaries to improve the situation and 
confidentiality can be preserved. When the matter involves application of the cy pres 
doctrine, the questions are of a different nature and the attorney general may be called 
upon to decide between conflicting claimants for the funds and forced to determine where 
the greatest benefit to the affected community lies, a decision that will not always been 
acceptable to all interested parties. 
A new challenge to the role of the attorneys general in preserving charitable funds 
arose in the late 1990s and early 2000s when there was a surge in the number of charities, 
notably health care organizations and nonprofit insurers, that attempted to convert from 
nonprofit to for-profit status. In several of the early conversions, the proceeds ended up in 
the hands of the fiduciaries of the converting entities or were added to other state funds, 
rather than being held under cy pres principles for continued charitable purposes. During 
a period of four years, twenty-five states enacted statutes explicitly granting the attorney 
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general the power to regulate conversions of health care organizations. Another ten states 
enacted statutes requiring approval by the court or the attorney general before the 
conversion, while in three others, conversions were prohibited. These developments 
posed problems for attorneys general who had not previously been active in charity 
regulation, while for others it was a reaffirmation of the positive role that can be played 
by that office. The speed with which these statutes were enacted indicated that, given 
sufficient financial interest, state legislatures were willing to increase regulation, in direct 
contrast to the lack of interest in improving or expanding more regulation of charities that 
has been the case for nearly 50 years. 
There is a good deal of cooperation among state officials in connection with 
interstate solicitations, less so in regard to abuse of fiduciary duty. As more fully 
described below, in recent years there have been several major cases in which two or 
more attorneys general disputed the disposition of the assets of charities operating in their 
respective jurisdictions, but these instances have not been commonplace. 
 Charity offices in a number of states attempt to provide affirmative support to the 
sector by publishing and disseminating information regarding fiduciary duties in print, 
over the internet and by sponsoring conferences for trustees, directors, lawyers and 
accountants. Their personnel are available for consultation with fiduciaries on questions 
relating to application of the cy pres doctrine and on framing petitions for dissolutions. In 
fact practitioners representing charities seeking application of the cy pres or deviation 
doctrines have found it prudent to seek advance agreement from the attorney general of 
the plan for which they are seeking court approval before it is filed in court, as it is the 
rare court that will approve any application as to which the attorney general has 
 15
  
expressed reservations or objections. Participation in these matters can be one of the most 
rewarding aspects of the oversight function, assuring as it is designed to do the future 
utility of funds that are intended to continue in perpetuity.  
Following a precedent begun in 1961 in Massachusetts, a number of attorneys 
general have established advisory committees comprised of representatives from the 
charitable sector and affected communities that meet on a regular basis to address 
common problems, assist in developing reporting forms, and framing and supporting 
legislation designed to improve the operations of the office. In contrast, from time to time 
there have been attorneys general who have interpreted their oversight function to be 
limited to prosecution of wrongdoers. In their view activities designed to support the 
sector and improve understanding of fiduciaries’ duties are inimicable to that primary 
function and impede their effectiveness. This does not appear to be a widely held view 
currently. 
 Valuable insight into the workings of the charities divisions of the state attorneys 
general was provided in a 2006 study conducted by the Council on Foundations and the 
Forum of Regional Associations of Grantmakers, in collaboration with NAAG-NASCO. 
Entitled “The Value of Relationships Between State Charity Regulators and 
Philanthropy”, its authors David Biemesderfer and Andras Kosaras conducted a survey of 
the regulation of charities by the attorneys general in 16 states.10 Included were the 
eleven states with general registration and reporting statutes (not restricted to charitable 
solicitation), and four additional ones, Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Texas, 
                       
10 David Biemesderfer and Andras Kosaras, The Value of Relationships Between State Charity Regulators 
and Philanthropy, Council on Foundations (Washington, DC, 2006). 
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thereby including in the survey those states with the largest number of private 
foundations. 
 Among the findings from the survey was that attorney general oversight most 
often fell within the purview of the consumer protection division or an equivalent 
division. Unlike the situation in the majority of states, where attorneys and staff are 
assigned to charities work only as necessary and not to separate charities sections, in 
almost all of the 16 states in the survey, there was a separate charities unit, often within 
the consumer protection division. The authors found it difficult to determine accurately 
the exact number of staff assigned to charity oversight and compare staffing levels. They 
reported that the states with the largest number of full time attorneys were New York, 
with 20, Pennsylvania with 12, California 11 and Ohio 10. Illinois had seven attorneys 
and Massachusetts and Texas each had six. At the other extreme, Oregon had three 
attorneys and New Hampshire one. At least six of the 16 states employed auditors or 
financial investigators, while additional staff handled the registration function. The 
authors compared these findings with surveys conducted the 1970s and 1990s and 
concluded that there has been no significant increase in the number of attorneys assigned 
to charity oversight. 
 As to the funding of enforcement activities, in the 11 states with general 
registration and reporting statutes, filing fees required in four of them are deposited in the 
general treasury. In the five states that have adopted the Uniform Act, fees are earmarked 
for enforcement. In some of these states, attorneys’ fees, fines and penalties collected 
from enforcement actions are also earmarked for charity regulation. The size of the fees 
varied among the states. Registration fees ranged from $15 to $50, with five states 
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imposing no fee. The fees for filing annual reports similarly varied, and in most instances 
were based on a sliding scale.  
 In recent years, the charities divisions in the surveyed states have increased 
outreach efforts, particularly through the internet. In eight of the 16 states, there was a 
hyperlink on the attorney general’s website home page to the charities section, while five 
states had links to the consumer protection division. Almost all of the states reviewed 
publish guides describing the laws regulating charities and the role of the attorney 
general. The 57 page California Attorney General’s Guide for Charities is the most 
comprehensive. NASCO also has links on its website to the charities divisions in its 
member states.  This survey also included case studies of efforts to improve relationships 
between the attorneys general and the charitable sector in four states, Illinois, Michigan, 
New Hampshire and Ohio through the establishment of advisory committees. 
One of the greatest drawbacks to assessing the efficacy of attorney general 
oversight is the lack of knowledge of both the extent of abuse and the degree to which 
states efforts have been successful in correcting them. This also means that it is not 
possible to determine with any certainty whether regulation is too stringent or too lenient. 
In an attempt to better understand the extent of wrongdoing by charitable fiduciaries, my 
colleague Andras Kosaras and I undertook a computer search of press reports of stories 
describing breaches of duty by directors, officers and trustees of charities published 
between 1995 and 2002 and included in the 13,111 sources in the data base of 
Lexis/Nexis. We identified 152 incidents involving civil or criminal wrongdoing, with 6 
in both categories, with 104 criminal cases and 54 involving breaches of the duties of 
loyalty and care. Among the factors we attempted to identify were the investigating 
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agency and the source of information on which it was instigated. The investigating 
agencies in the criminal cases were, primarily, district attorneys and U.S. attorneys, with 
attorneys general playing a minor role. In contrast, in the 54 breach of fiduciary duty 
cases, the attorney general brought suit or investigated 37 of them, while there was one 
case involving a U.S. attorney and one a district attorney. Of the cases investigated by an 
attorney general, 21 of them resulted in the filing of a civil law suit. The largest number 
of cases brought by an attorney general, nine, were brought in New York, while four 
were brought in Minnesota, three in Texas and two each in Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Oregon and Tennessee. We also attempted to ascertain how the prohibited activity came 
to light. Seven instances were uncovered during an audit by a governmental agency that 
had been a grantor to the charity. In 18 instances, wrongdoing was first identified during 
routine internal audits, 18 were brought to light by whistleblowers, and 11 were brought 
to light in press reports. None were specifically attributable to an independent 
investigation by an attorney general.  
With 152 incidents of wrongdoing during a seven-year period from a universe of 
an estimated 1.4 million charities, we concluded that there may be serious under-
reporting and an untold number of incidents that do not come to light due to federal and 
state laws respecting privacy. As to the question of whether stricter rules are needed or 
enhanced enforcement of existing laws would be sufficient to deter wrongdoing, we 
concluded that the study results did not provide an adequate basis on which to make an 
informed judgment. We did note, however, that the outcomes of the fiduciary duty cases 
demonstrated the important role state regulators can play in protecting charitable funds, 
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whether by terminating or reorganizing charities or removing and replacing fiduciaries 
who have breached their duties.11
 
SHORTCOMINGS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OVERSIGHT 
 The major criticism of attorney general oversight of charities until recent years 
has been lack of attention. Recently, however, complaints have centered on the opposite, 
namely overreaching and interference with the legitimate operations and structure of 
charities within their jurisdiction.12 In addition, as noted above, there have been a number 
of well publicized incidents in which attorneys general from two or more states have 
found themselves in dispute over the proper disposition of assets held in their 
jurisdictions by organizations that operated in many states. Examples of this latter 
situation arose in 2003 and 2004 in cases in which national health care agencies were 
seeking conversions or sale of their properties. Of note were the disputes over disposition 
of the assets from the conversion of Health Midwest that operated in Missouri and 
Kansas. The attorneys general from both states sued to remove Health Midwest's board 
for abandoning their charitable purpose. The matter was resolved with agreement to a 
settlement under which the sale was permitted to proceed and the proceeds were divided 
into two separate conversion foundations, each to operate with oversight from the 
attorneys general in their respective jurisdictions.  
 Another example involved the attempt by Banner Health System, an Arizona 
nonprofit charity, to sell its facilities in North and South Dakota and concentrate its 
                       
11 Marion R. Fremont-Smith and Andras Kosaras, "Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities: A 
Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002." 42 Exempt Organization Tax Review, 25 (2003). 
12 See, Evelyn Brody, “Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement,” 
79 Indiana Law Journal 937 (2004), which contains detailed descriptions of a number of examples of 
attorney general involvement in interstate disputes.  
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operations in Arizona and Colorado. The North Dakota dispute was settled with a 
payment by Banner of $1 million to be used to fund charitable activities in the state under 
the supervision of the attorney general. The South Dakota case was similarly settled, in 
this instance with payment in 2004 of $1.8 million to five South Dakota communities as 
compensation for the sale of three hospitals and five nursing homes in those areas.13  
 In an unusual case originally filed in 2004 and settled in 2007, the attorneys 
general and the courts in Mississippi and Tennessee were called on to determine the 
propriety of one of two trustees of a charitable trust moving its assets from Tennessee, the 
state in which it was created, to a Mississippi charitable corporation she established and 
of which, under Mississippi law, she could be the sole director. The legal suits brought in 
both states included allegations of misuse of the charitable funds in both states.  
However, under a settlement approved by the Mississippi court, $55 million was to be 
distributed to a newly reconstituted Tennessee trust, the trustees of which will be 
appointed by state officials with state court approval, while approximately $50 million 
will be retained by the Mississippi charity. The allegations of misuse of funds were not 
discussed in the settlement and to date there is no public evidence that they will be 
pursued.14
 Given the fact that the office of attorney general is an elective position in all but 
seven states, it is inevitable that politics will enter into decisions as to how to handle 
charity cases. This is particularly true where the issue is whether assets can be moved 
from the state to another jurisdiction. Some would argue that it is unrealistic to expect a 
state official to take a position other than a parochial one. Of the seven other states, the 
                       
13 “South Dakota settles lawsuit with Banner Health,” Bismark Tribune, March 19 2004. 
14 Debra E. Blum, “$100-Million Foundation in Legal Dispute Will Be Split Into Two Funds,” The 
Chronicle of Philanthropy, May 31, 2007. 
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attorney general is appointed by the state supreme court in one, by the legislature in one 
other, and by the governor in the remaining five. These differences do not appear to have 
had an appreciable effect on the nature of charity regulation, but warrant further 
examination. 
Charges of politicization of charity cases have also been brought from time to 
time against attorneys general in cases that have arising when that official was running 
for another political office, such as governor. This was the situation in the well publicized 
efforts by the then attorney general of Pennsylvania to block a sale by the trustees of the  
Hershey Trust of the controlling interest the trust held in stock of the Hershey company. 
Among the outcomes were a substantial change in the Pennsylvania Modern Prudent 
Investor Rule, a substantial loss in the value of the trust assets by virtue of the prohibition 
on their sale, and the forced resignation of the Board that had considered the sale and 
their replacement by the court and the attorney general.15 In another instance in which 
geography was a major factory, the attorney general of Illinois successfully blocked a 
plan adopted by trustees of the Terra Foundation for the Arts in Chicago to move the 
Museum out of the state.16  
Another recent example, one that represented an extreme act of overreaching, was 
the attempt by the Michigan attorney general in 2006 to force the Ford Foundation to 
increase its grant making in the state. He attempted to accomplish this by proposing 
legislation that would have amended the "Michigan Uniform Supervision of Trustees for 
Charitable Purposes Act" by specifically empowering the attorney general to enforce 
                       
15 Brody, supra note 12; Harvey Dale, “Prudence Perverted: Politics, Perceptions, and Pressures,” (2006), 
available at http://www.tiff.org/TEF/seminars/archive/files/2006/PrudencePerverted.pdf; Mark Sidel, “The 
Struggle for Hershey: Community Accountability and the Law in Modern American Philanthropy,” 65 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
16 Brody, supra note 12. 
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through court proceedings the intent of grantors' concerning grants and distributions from 
charitable trusts (under Michigan law this includes charitable corporations) and adopting 
a presumption that, unless a contrary intent was specifically established in the governing 
instrument, grants made in the first five years of the trust would determine where the 
donor intended them to be made and the nature of the recipients. In addition, it would be 
presumed that the intent of the grantors would be violated if less than 50% of the amount 
of the trusts’ grants or distributions in the most recent 3-year period before the action was 
commenced were made to recipients outside of the geographic location where the 
grantors established the trust or if they were made to different types of recipients to 
which grants or distributions were made in the period from the appointment of the 
original trustees to the date on which a majority of the trustees were not the original 
trustees. The effective date was not specified but the attorney general made it clear that 
the provisions were to apply to all trusts and charitable corporations whenever created, 
not just those established after the effective date. Strong opposition to the bill was 
expressed both within and outside of the state and as of October 2007, the legislature had 
not acted on it.17   
Another set of recent instances in which charges of politicization have been raised 
involved attempts to convert Blue Cross/Blue Shield and similar third party payer health 
insurance plans to for-profit status. Brody's study recounts the dispute involving 
Maryland, Delaware and the District of Columbia in which the Maryland legislature 
effectively prohibited the conversion of CareFirst, a plan that operated in all three states, 
                       
17 H.B. 6153, 93rd Leg. (Mich. 2006). 
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regardless of the fact that the regulators and plan subscribers in D.C. and Delaware were 
not opposed to the proposed action.18  
 The controversy over a proposal to convert Empire BlueCross BlueShield of New 
York exemplifies the problems that can arise when an attorney general, for political 
reasons, declines to represent the public interest in a dispute over charitable funds. Under 
New York law, conversions of nonprofit health insurance organizations were prohibited 
unless the legislature specifically approved the transaction. Starting in 1996, Empire 
attempted to convert relying on proposed legislations under the terms of which the 
proceeds of the conversion would be held by a charitable foundation. While the bill was 
pending, at the behest of Governor Pataki, it was amended so that only 5% of the 
proceeds would be set aside for the foundation, while 95% would be added to the state 
budget to be used to raise the salaries of healthcare workers. Attorney General Spitzer 
and his predecessor had acquiesced in the original plan for disposition of the conversion 
assets. However, when the legislature subsequently altered the plan, he  took the position 
that it was his duty to uphold the statute. Not only did he not protest the diversion of 
funds, but in a suit to block the transaction brought by consumer groups, he asserted that 
they had no standing to pursue their claims. The court ultimately granted standing to the 
plaintiffs on the basis that they had a "special interest", noting that it was the duty of the 
attorney general to defend the statute, but that his failure to do so left the beneficiaries 
without representation and expanding standing was a reasonable solution to the 
                       
18 Brody, supra note 12 at pp. 1019-1026. 
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problem.19 Ultimately, the suit failed and the conversion was accomplished, with 
approximately $6 billion transferred to the state. 
The Empire case illustrates the need for an exception to the standing rules when 
the attorney general has conflicting duties and either cannot, or chooses because of the 
conflict not to bring suit. In such situations, he is empowered under common law and in 
some states by statute to appoint relators to bring suit on his behalf, or he can appoint 
private individuals to serve as special assistant attorneys general to represent the 
charitable beneficiaries. California has codified this procedure by statute.20 However, use 
of relators is not a common procedure. In no event should an attorney general be 
permitted to prevent the charitable interests from being heard in court.  
 Another shortcoming of state oversight arises from mis- understanding on the part 
of state regulators of the federal tax rules that govern the formation and operation of 
charities. This was highlighted in a unanimous decision of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in October 2006.21 The case was brought by the trustee of a perpetual trust 
established in 1959 to apply the net income to provide scholarships to graduates of the 
high school in the city in which the donor had resided. The trustee’s petition, to which the 
attorney general assented, requested the court to modify the terms of the trust in three 
respects, one of which to was to permit it to increase the aggregate annual trust 
distributions so that they would equal the amount required to be distributed annually by 
private foundations under Internal Revenue Code section 4942, currently equal to five 
percent of the value of the foundation's investment assets. The trustee had alleged that the 
                       
19 Brody, supra note 12 at pp. 1026-1034; See also Jill R. Horwitz and Marion R. Fremont-Smith, “The 
Common Law Power of the Legislature: Insurer Conversions and Charitable Funds,” 83 Milbank Quarterly 
225, 225-231 (2005). 
20 Brody, supra note 12.  
21 U.S. Trust Co v. Attorney General, 854 N.E. 2d 1231 (Mass. 2006). 
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change was necessary if the trust was to avoid the tax on private foundations imposed 
under section 4942 as well as under Massachusetts General Laws section 68A that 
applies the federal rules to Massachusetts private foundations.22  
 The court rejected the trustee’s request, holding that such a change, although it 
would "avoid a relatively small tax," would result in annual distributions of a large 
portion of the principal, thereby departing from the donor's intent that the trust be 
perpetual.23 This conclusion ignored, as did the briefs submitted by attorneys for the 
trustee, the fact that section 4942 provides for two levels of tax: an initial tax equal at the 
date the decision was rendered to 30% of any undistributed amounts remaining at the end 
of each tax year; and an additional tax equal to 100% of the amount remaining 
undistributed at the end of such year and each succeeding one. Thus the court's 
conclusion that without reformation it would be possible to use some of the income for 
scholarships and the rest for tax without touching the principal misstated the effect of its 
decision, reflecting a profound misunderstanding of both the Internal Revenue Code 
provisions and Massachusetts laws governing charities on the part of all parties, including 
the attorney general.  
Seven months after the U.S. Trust Company decision, the Massachusetts court in 
effect overruled the case, noting that the impact of the second level tax had not been 
brought to its attention during oral argument. "It is now apparent that our reasoning on 
the matter...rested on incomplete information and, therefore, is incorrect and creates a 
                       
22 At the date the petition was filed, the tax was equal to fifteen per cent of the difference between the 
required distribution and the amount actually distributed at the end of each tax year in which it remains 
undistributed. This was increased in 2006 to 30% effective for tax years beginning after August 17, 2006.  
23 U.S. Trust Co., supra note 21. 
 26
  
precedent that should not be followed in like situations."24 The court suggested that the 
trustee of the scholarship trust might in the future wish to seek further reformation and 
indicated its willingness to reconsider its decision “in order to achieve consistency in our 
treatment of similarly situated parties who appear before us.” 
 In addition to criticisms of attorney general oversight on the grounds that it is 
ineffective and too often fueled by political considerations, there are two trends in 
enforcement that have raised concerns among commentators as to whether the attorney 
general is the most appropriate regulator. The first concern relates to the increasing use 
by attorneys general of the threat of litigation to force charities to agree to settlement of 
disputes with conditions that are far more restrictive than the law requires or that might 
be imposed by a court. 
One example is a settlement between the Massachusetts attorney general and the 
trustees of Boston University of a controversy over the university’s investment policy. 
Under the terms of the settlement, the trustees agreed to changes in governance, including 
mandating fixed terms of office for directors, giving alumni and faculty a voice in 
nominating board member and requiring that certain procedures be followed for 
approving the salary of the president. 
The Massachusetts attorney general imposed similar terms in a 2006 settlement 
reached after he threatened litigation that would have delayed sale of the Boston Red Sox 
by the successors to the original owners, one of which was a charitable foundation. 
Among the terms of the settlement, the trustees of the foundation agreed to changes in 
                       
24 In Re Will of Crabtree, 865 N.E.2d 1119 (Mass. 2007). 
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their governance that included appointment of five new trustees acceptable to the attorney 
general and adoption of a conflict of interest policy approved by him.25
 As noted above, in the resolution of the controversies involving the Hershey Trust 
and the Terra Foundation the attorneys general in Pennsylvania and Illinois respectively 
exercised strong influence over the composition of the boards. Brody also describes in 
her 2004 article efforts of the attorney general in Minnesota to name members of the 
boards of three health care plans, Alina Health Care, Health Partners and Medica Health 
Plan.26  
 Although the state officials involved in each of these examples are unlikely to 
agree, they represent unwarranted extension of oversight powers into areas in which the 
law has traditionally granted autonomy to fiduciaries. In other words, an attorney general 
is not empowered to regulate or direct the day to day affairs of a charity and certainly not 
to second guess the decisions of its fiduciaries as to how they will carry out their mission. 
It is difficult to imagine remedies to prevent this type of overstepping; better public 
understanding of the limits of state power might be a first step. 
 
MEASURES TO IMPROVE STATE OVERSIGHT  
 INCREASE FUNDING: The short comings of attorney general oversight have 
long been attributed to the lack of funding of state programs, which has meant lack of 
adequate staff and, consequently, ineffective policing. As noted, in a few states, filing 
fees are earmarked for support of the regulatory programs while in others, the fees are 
                       
25 Jamie Katz, “State Regulation of Foundations,” in State of Philanthropy 2006: Creating Dialogue for 
Tomorrow’s Movements, 95-103 (National Committee for Responsible Philanthropy 2006); See, Brody, 
supra note 12 at 1004, note 327. 
26 Brody, supra note 12 at pp. 1004-1008. 
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added to the general state treasury. In none of them is the amount raised sufficient to 
support meaningful oversight. In all states, charity regulation competes with other duties 
of the attorney general, often having the lowest priority.  
In the 1960s I suggested federal funding of state programs similar to the funding 
of unemployment insurance and social security programs, whereby federal funds would 
be available to states that adopt certain standards for charity administration and establish 
a regulatory program that meets federal requirements. The suggestion was uniformly 
ignored until 2004 when increased funding to the states for charity regulation was one of 
the recommendations from the 2004 Senate Finance Committee Staff for reforming 
oversight of charities27. The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in its Final Report supported 
increasing federal funding to the states to establish or improve regulation conditioned on 
their adopting uniform state filing requirements and minimum standards for oversight and 
enforcement.28  I remain pessimistic as to the prospects of improving state oversight 
without such financial support, but equally pessimistic as to the possibilities of Congress 
providing it. 
PROVIDE INFORMATION AND SUPPORT TO ATTORNEYS GENERAL: There 
is a new initiative from NAAG that may signal a change in attitude among the attorneys 
general. It is one that, if successful, could result in improved, and possibly more wide-
spread activity. In the spring of 2007, NAAG and Columbia Law School, received 
funding for a program designed to generate broader interest among the attorneys general 
in expanding and improving existing regulation of charities. Among the activities 
                       
27Staff of Senate Finance Comm., Staff Discussion Draft, 108th Cong. 12 (2004), available at: 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf  
28 Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of Charitable 
Organizations:  A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (2005), available at 
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf. 
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contemplated are establishment of a clearing house for information on state and federal 
enforcement efforts, available to regulators through a web site; providing technical 
assistance to individual attorneys general and their staff interested in instituting or 
expanding regulatory efforts; and publishing independent materials on the intersection of 
charities and state regulation. An advisory committee comprised of regulators, academics 
and practitioners has been established to guide the managers of the project. They held a 
first meeting in early October 2007. 
EXPAND STANDING RULES TO ASSURE REPRESENTATION OF THE 
PUBLIC IN MATTERS AS TO WHICH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS A NECESSARY 
PARTY BUT CANNOT OR WILL NOT ACT: In the last ten years, many scholars and 
practitioners, frustrated with the lack of effective state regulation, have called for 
expansion of the standing rules to permit enforcement by certain members of the public. 
The argument is that since attorney general enforcement is weak and this is unlikely to 
change, the only recourse is to let others take on that role. Under existing law, as noted, it 
is only in a few limited circumstances that individuals have standing to seek correction of 
abuses of fiduciary duties by charitable directors and trustees. UMIFA permitted donors 
to release restrictions; UPMIFA permits them to agree to modifications. The Uniform 
Trust Code, promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2000, went 
much further, reversing common law precedent by permitting donors to sue to enforce the 
terms of their charitable gifts. By October 2007, this law had been adopted in 19 states 
and it was likely to be accepted even more broadly in the ensuing years. 
Under common law principles, co-trustees and directors do have standing to 
correct abuses, and there are a few cases in which the courts have permitted other 
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interested parties such as hospital patients, park abutters and alumni to bring suit. A 
major factor in the decision to permit suit by an interested party to proceed has been the 
absence of any state official able or willing to act. As noted above, under common law in 
some states, and by statute in others, attorneys general may appoint relators to bring 
enforcement actions in his name, most often with the relators bearing the cost of 
litigation. In fact, Zollmann describes this as the proper form of action when the attorney 
general is the plaintiff. “A private relator is important in such a case for the reason that 
someone must be responsible for costs if it appears that the information is unfounded.”29
I am opposed to expanding standing as a general rule, both to donors and to 
members of the general public. This recommendation is narrowly framed and would 
permit intervention in suits only in those situations where the attorney general is a 
necessary party to the action and either believes he is conflicted from participating or for 
other reasons chooses not to participate. 
AMEND THE UNIFORM SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE 
PURPOSES ACT TO CORRECT AMBIGUITIES AND REFLECT CURRENT 
REGULATORY NEEDS: The Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes 
Act needs to be amended if it is to be a meaningful precedent for new regulatory 
programs. The most serious shortcoming, one that led to subsequent amendment of the 
act in states which had adopted it (notably Michigan and Illinois) is its failure to 
explicitly include charitable corporations in its coverage. Another serious limitation is the 
breadth of charities exempt from the filing provisions, notably those with educational and 
hospital purposes. The act also fails to identify those suits in which the attorney general 
should be considered a necessary party, as well as those in which he should be a proper 
                       
29 Zollmann, supra note 2 at 429. 
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party. Further, the act should contain provisions requiring notice to the attorney general 
of a substantial contraction of assets, of dissolutions (if not under court supervision – a 
far better procedure) and of mergers. 
In 2004 the Commissioners established a Study Committee on Regulation of 
Charities to consider whether any future action should be taken on this subject. At their 
request, Prof. Laura Chisolm of Case Western Reserve Law School analyzed whether the 
Uniform Act needed revision, and if so, how to improve it, and whether revision would 
be politically feasible. In addition to the shortcomings mentioned above, she noted the 
lack of guidelines for attorney general action in the context of interstate or multi-state 
issues and the fact that the act has not kept up with drastic changes in related laws 
affecting charities, notably the overriding importance of federal tax law. She concluded 
that with appropriate revision, it could serve as a useful model for states that have nothing 
on the books, while noting that the needed reforms seem less likely to rally the support of 
attorneys general, so that the issue may stay in the realm of “academic pondering”.30  In 
August 2007, the Executive Committee of NCCUSL voted to establish a drafting 
committee on the regulation of charities to consider four specific topics: codification and 
articulation of attorney general authority over charitable assets, whether held in trust or 
owned outright by charitable corporations; specification of transactions and legal 
proceedings that require notice to an attorney general; articulation of attorney general 
investigatory powers and available remedies; development and codification of principles 
to guide attorneys general in regard to interstate and multi-state problems, and 
encouragement of collaboration among attorneys general. The drafting committee was 
                       
30 Laura Chisolm, “State Oversight of Charitable Organizations: Is There Space for NCCUSL?” 2006. 
Paper on file with author. 
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directed to hold a "stakeholder" meeting, after which it was to report to the Executive 
Committee. 
AMEND SUBSTANTIVE LAWS TO ACHIEVE UNIFORMITY AND CLARITY 
AND ASSURE THAT PENALTIES FOR BREACH OF DUTY PROVIDE MEANINGFUL 
DETERRENTS: Efforts to improve attorney general oversight of charities will be 
meaningless if the laws that regulators are directed to enforce are ineffective to correct 
abuses. This is, unfortunately, the case in many jurisdictions. There are several aspects to 
the problem. The first is that, in many states, charity law is virtually non-existent and 
courts, unsure as to the extent of their power to correct abuses, are often reluctant to act. 
When they do, furthermore, they are likely to turn to business laws for precedents, 
regardless of the fact that these laws are not appropriate in the context of nonprofit 
organizations. Second, in many jurisdictions, it is unclear whether and in what 
circumstances trust law or corporate law is to apply in defining fiduciary duties as well as 
the disposition of charitable assets. 
There have been calls in the literature since the early 1960s for the adoption of 
one law of charity, although this view is not universally supported. In fact, some 
commentators argue that two standards should be preserved with donors permitted to 
choose the one they prefer. Although there may be merit to this position in terms of the 
laws governing the creation and operation of charities, changes of purposes, and 
application of the doctrines of cy pres and deviation, it is difficult to justify when the 
issue is the definition of fiduciary duties and the sanctions to be applied when they are 
abused. 
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Finally, in many of the jurisdictions in which charity law is well defined, during 
the last twenty-five years, legislatures have relaxed the standards for charitable 
fiduciaries, expanded the circumstances under which they can be indemnified and, in 
some jurisdictions, permitted them to provide fiduciaries with complete immunity from 
suit by adopting liability shields. The American Law Institute project on Principles of the 
Law of Nonprofit Organizations, inaugurated in 2002 has already had an important 
impact on the development of a uniform law of charity. It promises to be the most likely 
means by which this will be accomplished in the future. 
ARTICULATE THE LIMITS ON THE OVERSIGHT ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL SO THAT THE PUBLIC WILL UNDERSTAND AND RESIST WHEN THEY 
ARE BREACHED: This is an amorphous recommendation and, undoubtedly one that will 
be difficult to achieve. Yet, the need is apparent, and other than public outcry and 
resistance, there does not seem to be an easy remedy. There is a role here for the press, as 
well as individual legislators who in certain circumstances can act as spokesmen for the 
charitable sector. Happily, although the examples are striking, they are not indicative of 
wide-spread overreaching and one can hope that this will continue to be the case. 
 
RELATIONSHIP OF FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT 
A major drawback to effective state action is the absence of meaningful 
cooperation between state officials and the IRS in connection with specific matters. This 
has been the case despite the fact that section 6104(c), enacted as part of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 contained a provision specifically authorizing the IRS to notify state charity 
regulators with respect to determinations relating to the denial or revocation of tax 
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exemption of charities in their jurisdictions. Prior to this, the IRS was empowered to 
exchange information only with state tax officials. However, Treasury regulations 
promulgated under this section effectively undermined the statute by interpreting 
“determination” to mean a final determination, which meant that no information could be 
provided until all administrative review was completed, at which time it would inevitably 
be far too late for a state agency to take action to effectively protect charitable assets.  
Legislation to correct this shortcoming has long been recommended by Congress, 
the GAO and state regulators. It was adopted as part of the Pension Protection Act of 
2006. However, there are still obstacles to free exchange of information. The new statute 
requires a request from the state official before the IRS can provide any information. Of 
course, if the federal matter has been privileged, it is the rare instance case in which a 
state regulator will have information sufficient to make the request. 
 
FEDERAL LAW CHANGES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE STATE OVERSIGHT 
 Even if one concludes that state oversight is inappropriate because it is 
ineffective, or because it is overreaching and thereby serves to restrict, not enhance, 
charitable activity, it is difficult to envision the outcome should there be full federal 
preemption of charity regulation. This is not to say that it would be impossible to create a 
federal law of charity nor even to require all charities to be organized under a federal 
enabling statute. However, for the immediate future, I do not envision such a 
development, nor do I think it would be advisable.  
I believe that determining donor intent, framing cy pres and deviation schemes, 
and applying sanctions for breach of fiduciary duties are an appropriate function of courts 
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that are familiar with local situations and local needs. Naturally, they will be asked to 
adjudicate issues that are not local, but those will be a small fraction of the cases and 
there is no evidence that they are incompetent to do so. Finally, to the extent that 
uniformity is needed for federal purposes, this can be achieved through Code provisions 
and Regulations such as those found in Section 508 and in the Organizational Test for tax 
exemption under which trust instruments and corporate articles of organization must 
include language limiting powers and purposes and assuring that on dissolution assets 
will be transferred to other qualified exempt entities.  
 Accepting that we will for the present retain two levels of oversight, it is prudent 
to consider measures that will improve coordination of federal and state regulation.  The 
need to expand the ability of the IRS to provide information to state regulators has 
already been discussed. However, there are two other federal changes that would greatly 
enhance current oversight.  
The first would be to expand the power of the IRS to abate federal penalties if 
states have acted to protect charitable funds. This power already exists in regard to 
private foundations. It is to be found in section 507 under which abatement of the 
confiscatory termination tax on private foundations is permitted if there has been state 
action to preserve the charitable assets. A case can be made for mandating abatement 
where the state has preserved assets and imposed penalties, but at the least the IRS should 
be empowered to so act. 
The positive effects of abatement are exemplified in a controversy involving the 
Massachusetts Attorney General and the Paul and Virginia Cabot Charitable Trust, a 
Massachusetts charity that was the subject of an article in the Boston Globe in 2003 in 
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which the managing trustee admitted to diverting several million dollars from the trust for 
his own personal purposes.31 In 2004 the attorney general’s office announced that the 
trustee had agreed to repay the foundation more than $4 million. However, in 2006 the 
attorney general's office reported that it had collected only $900,000 because the IRS had 
claimed a large part of the settlement amount as fines for self-dealing. Subsequently, 
some of the trustee’s children claimed part of his assets, threatening litigation to preserve 
their inheritance. Rather than become involved in a family dispute which would have 
entailed large legal fees and diversion of his limited staff from other matters, the Attorney 
General agreed to the compromise.32  
 The second change that would improve federal and state regulatory efforts, a 
measure supported by the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, that also has a precedent in 
Chapter 42. Section 508(e) of the Code conditions tax exemption for a private foundation 
on inclusion in its governing document of a provision requiring compliance with the 
limitations on private foundation operations contained in Chapter 42, including a specific 
prohibition on foundation managers entering into any self-dealing transactions prohibited 
in that chapter. Instead of requiring inclusion of the requisite language in articles of 
organization or trust documents, regulations adopted in 1972 provide that the governing 
instrument requirement can be met if a valid state law imposes these obligations on all 
private foundations within its jurisdiction. By 1975 forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia had passed such laws. These statutes provide state regulatory officials with 
grounds for prosecuting failures to comply with federally imposed rules, an 
unprecedented example of coordination of the two regulatory schemes. 
                       
31 Beth Healy, Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael Rezendes, Walter V. Robinson, “Some Officers of 
Charities Steer Assets to Selves,” The Boston Globe, October 9, 2003 at A1. 
32 Katz, supra note 25. 
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 Under the Panel’s proposal, a similar provision would apply to all publicly 
supported charities (the remaining universe of organizations exempt under section 
501(c)(3)), requiring compliance with the Excess Benefit provisions in Code section 
4958.33 Maine adopted such a provision in its 2002 charities act and the Massachusetts 
attorney general in 2005 supported its adoption in that state, although the bill was not 
passed.34  
Opponents of this legislation note that there are no reported instances in which a 
state has taken legal action against a private foundation solely on the grounds of failure to 
comply with these state provisions. This does not mean that the prohibitions have not 
served as a deterrent, nor that threat of state litigation has not resulted in corrections. At 
best, it provides one more weapon for regulators and contributes to uniformity among the 
states. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Looking to the future of attorney general oversight, at the outset one must 
question the rationale for requiring charities to report to both the IRS and to state 
agencies. With electronic filing of Form 990 about to be implemented, there should be no 
need for this duplication. It is true that the reporting threshold for states and the IRS 
differ; nonetheless, at least as to those charities that are currently subject to dual 
reporting, the states should be able to get information from a federal clearing house. This 
will require greater coordination among the states and the IRS, as to both content and 
                       
33Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Interim Report presented to the Senate Finance Committee (2005), 
available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interim/PanelReport.pdf; Katz, supra note 25.  
34 See Panel, Final Report, supra note 28; See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.13-B §718 (2003); See H.B. 4347, 
184th Gen. Court (Mass. 2005). 
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coverage, a development that, as already noted, is to be encouraged in all events. This 
change would be equally important if, as discussed below, federal oversight was removed 
from the IRS. 
A second issue as we look to the future is the role of state oversight if federal 
regulation of charities were to be lodged in a newly created federal agency. A proposal 
for such a new agency has been suggested by Marcus Owens, former director of the 
exempt organizations division of the IRS and is being considered by state and federal 
regulators, scholars, legislators and practitioners alike. When combined with the 
recommendations of the staff of the Senate Finance Committee that the federal courts be 
granted equity powers similar to those held by the state courts, one is forced to reconsider 
the appropriate role for state regulation. The answer would, in part, depend on the 
framework adopted, including whether and to what extent the IRS would continue to 
have regulatory powers. However, I believe the argument for a local voice in 
enforcement of fiduciary duties and application of the doctrines of cy pres and deviation 
remains compelling. 
When one considers regulation of solicitation, I believe a strong case can be made 
for federal preemption at least of the information gathering function. In the 1970s I 
recommended to the Filer Commission that responsibility for regulating charitable 
solicitations be lodged with the Federal Trade Commission with which soliciting charities 
would be required to register and file reports regarding that aspect of their activities. 
Today, the FTC remains an appropriate situs to consider, particularly in light of the fact 
that it currently regulates for-profit entities that solicit for charities, notably 
telemarketers.  I believe such a change would be particularly important if the IRS is to 
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retain its existing role as regulator of tax exempt charities, primarily because fundraising 
activities cannot be effectively policed through the Code, and accordingly the IRS is not 
constituted to regulate them effectively.  However, if a newly created agency for charity 
regulation should be established, it should have the broadest oversight powers, and if this 
were to come about, I would support including regulation of solicitations among those 
powers. 
Prof. Renee A. Irvin in 2005 put forth a contrary view of state regulation of 
solicitation. Specifically, she questioned the efficacy or registration and reporting 
requirements as a fraud detection methodology and suggested that state regulators would 
do better to concentrate on correcting abuses brought to their attention by consumers. She 
noted, further, that information now required by the states can be obtained through 
national clearing houses. Irvin’s study focused exclusively on statutes regulating 
solicitation. It did not consider the impact of the broader registration and reporting 
requirements in states such as New York, Ohio and Illinois where oversight is focused on 
abuse of fiduciary duties in addition to fraudulent or misleading solicitations.35 Reliance 
on consumer complaints cannot provide the information needed for oversight of this 
nature. However, this does not mean that the states need to continue to require duplicate 
separate reports.  
If state registration and reporting requirements are to be eliminated, one would 
have to be assured that information necessary for their oversight purposes is available to 
state regulators. The natural source for information is, of course, IRS, but there would 
have to be some assurance that it would ask the right questions. It will also be important 
                       
35 Renée A. Irvin, “State Regulation of Nonprofit Organizations: Accountability Regardless of Outcome”, 
34 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 161 (2005). 
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to determine an appropriate threshold for reporting. As of 2007, the IRS reporting 
threshold for Form 990 filing is annual gross receipts of $25,000, but it is very possible 
that this amount will be increased, particularly with adoption of a revised form 990. The 
inclusion of extensive questions on governance practices in the revision of that form 
released for public comment by the IRS in spring of 2007, signals a new focus for IRS 
regulation closer to the interest of the states than heretofore, so this may be an appropriate 
time to consider state law revisions. If ultimately federal oversight is moved to a new 
agency, the issues will be the same and the need for coordination of federal and state 
oversight equally pressing. 
Another contrary view of state oversight has been voiced by Prof. James Fishman, 
who has questioned whether attorneys general are the right officials to exercise oversight 
of charities or whether this power would better to be placed under the jurisdiction of a 
new state regulatory agency similar to the British Charity Commission.36 This mirrors, of 
course, on a state by state basis, proposals for a new federal agency. I suggest that the 
chances for adoption of such a change are extremely slight, given the current lack of 
interest in the vast majority of states in increasing any sort of regulation. Furthermore, if 
the primary purpose of such a move is to decrease politicization, one need be concerned 
that a new body might be far less insulated than an attorney general.37
                       
36 James J. Fishman, “Improving Charitable Accountability,” 62 Maryland Law Review 218 (2003) pp. 272-
287. 
37 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it should also be noted that there are a number of state 
agencies other than the office of the attorney general that have a role in charity oversight. Most visible are 
the departments of education and health that, through their roles in accreditation and licensing, have broad 
regulatory powers, although they are not necessarily focused directly on breaches of fiduciary duty. The 
New York state Board of Regents is an example of a state regulatory body does monitor fiduciary duties, as 
was illustrated in its case against the trustees of Adelphi University that resulted in removal of almost an 
entire board and imposition of heavy fines for engaging in self-dealing transactions. State, as well as 
federal, agencies with which charities contract also regulate to varying degrees the operations and 
governance of their grantees or the parties to their contracts. State anti-discrimination laws also may impact 
the operations of certain charities and, of course, state tax statutes have a limited effect. None, however, 
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 As we consider any of these reforms, it is important to realize that we have no 
accurate knowledge of the extent of abuse by charitable fiduciaries. Similarly, we do not 
know the extent of abuse of power by attorneys general. One is forced, therefore, into a 
balancing act in which one tries to adopt the least intrusive standards, while signaling to 
fiduciaries that they will be held to those standards and assuring the public that funds 
dedicated for their ultimate benefit are not being diverted for private purposes nor being 
administered recklessly. Furthermore, the public, including the charitable sector, needs to 
be assured that the officials who provide oversight are mindful of the limits to their 
powers and that, ultimately, overreaching will not be tolerated --- a large, but one can 
hope, not insurmountable task. 
 
                                                                   
approach oversight with the breadth of power that is granted to an attorney general and none can exert 
sufficiently broad influence to improve compliance throughout the charitable sector.  
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